I have recently explored a new book on Asbestos. Specifically regarding the topic of Asbestos in schools. I thought I would share some of it with you as it is may interest you on the topic of Asbestos. Here is an excerpt:
The legal and scientific confusion surrounding asbestos appears to be an example of society operating to its own detriment. Although one of the authors is a principal beneficiary of the confusion (being in the asbestos abatement business), the whole thing is bewildering. It occurred to us that others may be confused as well, particularly persons involved with schools who must make some momentous decisions in coming years. Hence this book.
One of the authors is a physical scientist by training and an environment engineer by experience, with credentials as a person dedicated to a clean environment that never been questioned and with professional involvement in abatement of a great variety of truly hazardous substances.
The other author is a business lawyer of considerable experience who has never litigated on either side of an asbestos case. We both have talked too many lawyer involved in asbestos litigation and have come to believe that the whole process is unproductive to the point of being shamelessly wasteful. But that is of little help to people who have to make difficult institutional decisions, frequently with limited budgets, and difficult personal decisions as well.
Schools will have to make many agonizing decisions in 1987 and in coming years. Prior to august 1, 1987, for instance, every primary and secondary school in the united states, public and private, must have decided whether to participate in the class action suits now going on in federal court in the united states, public and private, must have decided whether participate in the class action suit now going on in federal court in the eastern district of Pennsylvania. Over coming months, possibly years, additional questions must be answered. How much asbestos do we have in our school? When should it be removed? How will we finance the removal? What should we tell parents and students in the meantime? What should we do about asbestos substitutes that are showing workplace harm similar to that of asbestos?
In addition to these questions that cannot be avoided, there are some questions that probably should be considered, such as the following: how can we benefit from this experience?, how can we help future generations avoid similar predicaments? After all, if schools will not undertake these educational tasks, who will?
This book answers none of the foregoing questions. However, it does attempt to give, in a dispassionate way, a great deal of information that we hope will be useful to those attempting to forge intelligent answers.
In the same book, however on the same page, it was noted that one of the most serious problems confronting the domestic consuming industry is our dependence for the greater part of our supply of asbestos on foreign sources. The article goes on to call for strategic stockpiling of asbestos and notes with approval work then under way aimed at developing even large-scale asbestos uses.
While the above article was being written some dramatic developments were plodding through U.S. courts. What is generally regarded as the seminal case. Borel v. Fibreboard paper products corp., reached the federal court of appeals in 1973. Borel was exposed to asbestos on the job from 1936 to 1969, when he became disabled with asbestosis and, a year later, mesothelioma. The facts and issues in his successful action typify those in personal injury asbestos litigation in general. Those issues are well known and will not be repeated here. However, one or two are interesting and worthy of note.
Counsel to the asbestos industry have taken two unusual positions that some lawyers, perhaps with the benefits of hindsight, consider to have been unfortunate. First, they have pleaded (and still plead) ignorance of the hazards involved, and hence inability to give warning. Second, they have refused (except in a case in Hawaii and possibly a few others) to raise the defense that many uses of asbestos were mandated by government building codes or procurement specification or both. The reason fly in the face common sense are illustrative, in our view of hyper legal mentalities obfuscating the real issues.
The plea of ignorance was made in fear. But it was impossible to proved because the risk were quite generally known. Even the asbestos industry itself had begun to respond to changing social at titudes coward risk. In 1964 warnings began to appear on asbestos products to the effect that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long period of time may be harmful and that workers should avoid breathing asbestos dust. (The barel court considered these admonitions to be inadequate, so much so as to constitute “black humor” in the judge’s opinion.) Johns-manville in 1969 adopted a policy of not selling asbestos fiber for non essential uses that might unduly expose the general public – for example, modelling compounds used in grade schools.
To our “Monday morning quarterback” minds under these circumstances a 1970 plea much more plausible than ignorance would have been that the risk we so generally known for such a long time that warning would have been as absurd as being obliged to warn a coal miner that he might get black lung or an automobile driver that he might have an accident. One additional irony of the industry position on ignorance has been the effect of extending the statue of limitations in many instances.
Refusal to raise the defense of government mandate has been founded, we are told by knowledgeable persons, on the belief that industry salespeople lobbied hard to obtain the building codes and regulations, it is easy to prove however, that essentially all government standards are the result of someone’s lobbying people who make durable bottles cases lobby against disposable bottles undaer the banner of beauty and saving natural resources. Domestic manufacturers of bicycles lobby for bulky safety devices applied in the factory, under the flag of safety (but in reality to increase cost for foreign manufacturers). Most government regulators would deny vebemently that they routinely are influenced in this fashion. And most juries probably would believe them.
In any event, an unparalleled situation in U.S. tort law began to unfold about 1970 and other branches of government have reacted swiftly and decisively.
Spraying asbestos for fireproofing and insulation purpose was banned by the environemental protection agency (EPA) in 1973. It later became apparent that the regulation were not sufficiently broad because they banned only insulation and fireproofing applications and not decorative uses a perceived defect that was cured by regulation in 1978.
One of the early state actions specifically directed toward schools was the New York State school asbestos safety act of 1979. The act gives broad permissive authority to the state commissioner of education to set standards and the like, and requires local school authorities to inspect and report to the commissioner on asbestos materials in schools to develop a land for the containment or removal of hazardous asbestos materials, to estimate the cost thereof, and to require contractors and supervisory personnel engaged in the containment or removal or removal to have received adequate training. The act does not require removal.
Other states have passed similar legislation for example, new jersy in 1984. At this writing 32 states have enacted more than 60 asbestos-related laws, three-fourths of them passed in 1985 and 1986.
Congress acted with the asbestos school hazard detection and control act of 1980, which required various studies and inspection and authorized financial assistance to schools. No funds were ever appropriated, however. The department of education estimated the cost of abatement, based upon report prepared by the EPA (but never published), the cost estimate for schools was doubled. As noted in chapter 4, removal cost metholodology is suspect and because even the defective numbers are too inflammatory to be circulated.
In may, 1982 the EPA published the “asbestos-in-school” rule which among other things, required school s to identify friable asbestos, test the air, and notify employees and parent-teacher groups of the findings, a deadline of June 28, 1983, was mandated. As of the end of 1986, according to EPA regional coordinators, 60 percent U.S. schools had failed to comply with the regulation.
Congress acted again with the asbestos school hazard abatement act (ASHAA) of 1984, which transferred authority for overseeing removal matters from the department of education to the EPA (great political victory for the latter agency). This act again authorized grant and loan funding to assist with abatement. Some $50 million was appropriated in 1984, 1985, and 1986, even though the EPA requested no funds.
Meanwhile, the EPA supplemented its 1973 han unsprayed product in 1979 with its publication of asbestos containing materials in school buildings a guidance document. Then in January 1986, the agency proposed sweeping regulation to prohibited the manufacture importation and processing of asbestos in certain products and to phase out the use of asbestos in all other products except a handful that might come to be permitted under a stringed exemption process. This proposed rule, which still is pending, would immediately ban asbestos cement pipe and fitting, roofing felts flooring felts, vinyl asbestos floor tile and, and asbestos clothing. Asbestos friction products (such as brake lining) would be prohibited after five years and all other products as a still later date. In the meantime products not yet banned would be required to bear frightful labels.
In august 1986 the EPA, discouraged over non-compliance ith 1982 directive to schools, published for comment a proposed rule in a program for more aggressive enforcement of exiting relations regarding asbestos in schools and for promulgation of additional school regulations under the Toxics Substance Control ACT (TSCA).
Congress put teeth in the proposed rule and expanded upon it with the enactment of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) of 1986, analysed in great detail in Appendix A. Under this act abatement is mandated for all friable school asbestos and some nonfriable. Brightly colored, large type label are to be place on certain asbestos awaiting abatement. The EPA is required to make and enforce more stringent regulations relating to asbestos.
The EPA’s response to the AHERA was to hold an open meeting on December 8, 1986, to discuss strategies for response to the act and to form and advisory committee and a negotiating process under which representative of all interested classes can participate in the set forth in full in Appendix B. It is expected to become final in October 1987.
The rule adopted will have great impact on schools. The financial impact will be many billions of dollars
adxasbestos removal.com 125 S Clark St Chicago, IL
The legal and scientific confusion surrounding asbestos appears to be an example of society operating to its own detriment. Although one of the authors is a principal beneficiary of the confusion (being in the asbestos abatement business), the whole thing is bewildering. It occurred to us that others may be confused as well, particularly persons involved with schools who must make some momentous decisions in coming years. Hence this book.
One of the authors is a physical scientist by training and an environment engineer by experience, with credentials as a person dedicated to a clean environment that never been questioned and with professional involvement in abatement of a great variety of truly hazardous substances.
The other author is a business lawyer of considerable experience who has never litigated on either side of an asbestos case. We both have talked too many lawyer involved in asbestos litigation and have come to believe that the whole process is unproductive to the point of being shamelessly wasteful. But that is of little help to people who have to make difficult institutional decisions, frequently with limited budgets, and difficult personal decisions as well.
Schools will have to make many agonizing decisions in 1987 and in coming years. Prior to august 1, 1987, for instance, every primary and secondary school in the united states, public and private, must have decided whether to participate in the class action suits now going on in federal court in the united states, public and private, must have decided whether participate in the class action suit now going on in federal court in the eastern district of Pennsylvania. Over coming months, possibly years, additional questions must be answered. How much asbestos do we have in our school? When should it be removed? How will we finance the removal? What should we tell parents and students in the meantime? What should we do about asbestos substitutes that are showing workplace harm similar to that of asbestos?
In addition to these questions that cannot be avoided, there are some questions that probably should be considered, such as the following: how can we benefit from this experience?, how can we help future generations avoid similar predicaments? After all, if schools will not undertake these educational tasks, who will?
This book answers none of the foregoing questions. However, it does attempt to give, in a dispassionate way, a great deal of information that we hope will be useful to those attempting to forge intelligent answers.
In the same book, however on the same page, it was noted that one of the most serious problems confronting the domestic consuming industry is our dependence for the greater part of our supply of asbestos on foreign sources. The article goes on to call for strategic stockpiling of asbestos and notes with approval work then under way aimed at developing even large-scale asbestos uses.
While the above article was being written some dramatic developments were plodding through U.S. courts. What is generally regarded as the seminal case. Borel v. Fibreboard paper products corp., reached the federal court of appeals in 1973. Borel was exposed to asbestos on the job from 1936 to 1969, when he became disabled with asbestosis and, a year later, mesothelioma. The facts and issues in his successful action typify those in personal injury asbestos litigation in general. Those issues are well known and will not be repeated here. However, one or two are interesting and worthy of note.
Counsel to the asbestos industry have taken two unusual positions that some lawyers, perhaps with the benefits of hindsight, consider to have been unfortunate. First, they have pleaded (and still plead) ignorance of the hazards involved, and hence inability to give warning. Second, they have refused (except in a case in Hawaii and possibly a few others) to raise the defense that many uses of asbestos were mandated by government building codes or procurement specification or both. The reason fly in the face common sense are illustrative, in our view of hyper legal mentalities obfuscating the real issues.
The plea of ignorance was made in fear. But it was impossible to proved because the risk were quite generally known. Even the asbestos industry itself had begun to respond to changing social at titudes coward risk. In 1964 warnings began to appear on asbestos products to the effect that inhalation of asbestos in excessive quantities over long period of time may be harmful and that workers should avoid breathing asbestos dust. (The barel court considered these admonitions to be inadequate, so much so as to constitute “black humor” in the judge’s opinion.) Johns-manville in 1969 adopted a policy of not selling asbestos fiber for non essential uses that might unduly expose the general public – for example, modelling compounds used in grade schools.
To our “Monday morning quarterback” minds under these circumstances a 1970 plea much more plausible than ignorance would have been that the risk we so generally known for such a long time that warning would have been as absurd as being obliged to warn a coal miner that he might get black lung or an automobile driver that he might have an accident. One additional irony of the industry position on ignorance has been the effect of extending the statue of limitations in many instances.
Refusal to raise the defense of government mandate has been founded, we are told by knowledgeable persons, on the belief that industry salespeople lobbied hard to obtain the building codes and regulations, it is easy to prove however, that essentially all government standards are the result of someone’s lobbying people who make durable bottles cases lobby against disposable bottles undaer the banner of beauty and saving natural resources. Domestic manufacturers of bicycles lobby for bulky safety devices applied in the factory, under the flag of safety (but in reality to increase cost for foreign manufacturers). Most government regulators would deny vebemently that they routinely are influenced in this fashion. And most juries probably would believe them.
In any event, an unparalleled situation in U.S. tort law began to unfold about 1970 and other branches of government have reacted swiftly and decisively.
Spraying asbestos for fireproofing and insulation purpose was banned by the environemental protection agency (EPA) in 1973. It later became apparent that the regulation were not sufficiently broad because they banned only insulation and fireproofing applications and not decorative uses a perceived defect that was cured by regulation in 1978.
One of the early state actions specifically directed toward schools was the New York State school asbestos safety act of 1979. The act gives broad permissive authority to the state commissioner of education to set standards and the like, and requires local school authorities to inspect and report to the commissioner on asbestos materials in schools to develop a land for the containment or removal of hazardous asbestos materials, to estimate the cost thereof, and to require contractors and supervisory personnel engaged in the containment or removal or removal to have received adequate training. The act does not require removal.
Other states have passed similar legislation for example, new jersy in 1984. At this writing 32 states have enacted more than 60 asbestos-related laws, three-fourths of them passed in 1985 and 1986.
Congress acted with the asbestos school hazard detection and control act of 1980, which required various studies and inspection and authorized financial assistance to schools. No funds were ever appropriated, however. The department of education estimated the cost of abatement, based upon report prepared by the EPA (but never published), the cost estimate for schools was doubled. As noted in chapter 4, removal cost metholodology is suspect and because even the defective numbers are too inflammatory to be circulated.
In may, 1982 the EPA published the “asbestos-in-school” rule which among other things, required school s to identify friable asbestos, test the air, and notify employees and parent-teacher groups of the findings, a deadline of June 28, 1983, was mandated. As of the end of 1986, according to EPA regional coordinators, 60 percent U.S. schools had failed to comply with the regulation.
Congress acted again with the asbestos school hazard abatement act (ASHAA) of 1984, which transferred authority for overseeing removal matters from the department of education to the EPA (great political victory for the latter agency). This act again authorized grant and loan funding to assist with abatement. Some $50 million was appropriated in 1984, 1985, and 1986, even though the EPA requested no funds.
Meanwhile, the EPA supplemented its 1973 han unsprayed product in 1979 with its publication of asbestos containing materials in school buildings a guidance document. Then in January 1986, the agency proposed sweeping regulation to prohibited the manufacture importation and processing of asbestos in certain products and to phase out the use of asbestos in all other products except a handful that might come to be permitted under a stringed exemption process. This proposed rule, which still is pending, would immediately ban asbestos cement pipe and fitting, roofing felts flooring felts, vinyl asbestos floor tile and, and asbestos clothing. Asbestos friction products (such as brake lining) would be prohibited after five years and all other products as a still later date. In the meantime products not yet banned would be required to bear frightful labels.
In august 1986 the EPA, discouraged over non-compliance ith 1982 directive to schools, published for comment a proposed rule in a program for more aggressive enforcement of exiting relations regarding asbestos in schools and for promulgation of additional school regulations under the Toxics Substance Control ACT (TSCA).
Congress put teeth in the proposed rule and expanded upon it with the enactment of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) of 1986, analysed in great detail in Appendix A. Under this act abatement is mandated for all friable school asbestos and some nonfriable. Brightly colored, large type label are to be place on certain asbestos awaiting abatement. The EPA is required to make and enforce more stringent regulations relating to asbestos.
The EPA’s response to the AHERA was to hold an open meeting on December 8, 1986, to discuss strategies for response to the act and to form and advisory committee and a negotiating process under which representative of all interested classes can participate in the set forth in full in Appendix B. It is expected to become final in October 1987.
The rule adopted will have great impact on schools. The financial impact will be many billions of dollars
adxasbestos removal.com 125 S Clark St Chicago, IL
